In 2006, the U.S. Special Operations Command’s Special Operations & Technology (SOST) office tasked the Crane Division, Surface Warfare Center, to develop a general combat ball round that would exhibit enhanced internal and external ballistics, and improved consistency in its terminal ballistics.  It required a capability to defeat intermediate barriers such as auto glass and doors when fired in a carbine-length weapon system.  The ammunition would have to maintain full compatibility with all existing weapon platforms.  In 2010, the United States Special Operations Command and the Marine Corps adopted the 62-grain 5.56x45mm MK318 MOD 0 SOST cartridge for use in all weapons of that caliber.  One other government arrived at a favorable legal review of SOST ammunition.  Its acceptance for military use offers further clarification of the 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets with respect to military small arms ammunition development.

The 1899 Hague Declaration
The First Hague Peace Conference brought together diplomats, military and scientific experts, and international lawyers from twenty-six of the fifty-nine nations that existed as sovereign states at that time.  It considered a broad range of proposals to limit resort to war, disarmament initiatives, and rules to temper the effects of combat with regard to injury to combatants and protection for the civilian population.

Initiatives often masked self-interests or political views of particular governments.  Disarmament proposals tended to play to a proponent’s strengths while governments individually resisted disarmament restrictions in areas where each was weak.  “Humanitarian” arguments were made to express support for or opposition to proposals under consideration depending on a delegation’s position.

Such was the case with respect to what became the 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets.  A question by the Swiss military representative as to a need for prohibiting military small arms projectiles “which aggravate wounds and increase suffering” focused on the British RL2 9402, Mk III .303 bullet, commonly referred to as a “Dum-Dum” owing to production of the cartridge at its arsenal near Calcutta.  The Netherlands representative, expressing his government’s opposition to British military operations against Boer (Dutch) settlers in South Africa, offered strong support in reply to the Swiss question.  Proponents relied on a report by a private German citizen using a civilian rifle and hunting ammunition to bolster their arguments.  Attacks on the British Mk. III were misplaced.  British forces did not use the Mk III in the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902).  Boer guerrillas allegedly employed hunting ammunition against British Commonwealth forces.  Some New Zealand soldiers may have brought limited amounts of Mk III ammunition with them to South Africa without official authorization, arriving after the 1899 Hague Conference concluded.

British defense of the Mk III was vigorous, pointing out that the terminal ballistics of the Mk III were significantly less than the (e.g.) .577 Snider and .45 Martini weapons that preceded caliber .303 weapons.  British arguments drew support from the U.S. delegation.  Captain (later Major General and Chief of U.S. Army Ordnance, 1901-1917) William Crozier argued the proposal should not focus on one particular design, but instead prohibit bullets that were designed to cause superfluous injury, terminology contained in the text of another treaty under consideration and ultimately adopted.

Proponents ultimately prevailed.  The 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets adopted by the conference contained the following language:

The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of bullets, which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions. 

The language did not limit expanding ammunition use in “colonial wars,” that is, its employment by government forces against insurgents within their respective colonial territories.  In using “abstain” rather than “prohibit,” the 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets was an arms control agreement, that is, each government accepting the Declaration agreed not to use expanding ammunition so long opposing military forces refrained from its use.  As such, the Declaration’s text did not conclude that “bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body” cause superfluous injury.

The 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets was written in the midst of a revolutionary time in military ammunition development.  Less than a quarter century prior to the 1899 conference, military forces were equipped with single shot black powder rifles firing 10 to 12mm lead bullets at velocities averaging less than 500 meters per second.  They expanded in soft (human) tissue.  France introduced the more powerful smokeless powder in military cartridges in 1886 with its 8mm Lebel.  Switzerland developed jacketed ammunition in the mid-1880s, fielding its 7.5mm Schmitt-Rubin 7.5x53mm cartridge with a round nosed projectile fired at 600 meters per second in 1890.  By the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, modern armies had developed and been equipped with magazine repeater rifle in 6.5 to 8mm caliber employing round nosed bullets with velocities ranging from 600 to 800 meters per second.  The Declaration is a qualified prohibition that must be viewed in light of historical practice prior to, at the time of, and since its adoption.

Over the next century, only 34 nations (of today’s 194) became party to the Declaration.  The prohibition on weapons or munitions that cause superfluous injury was adopted in a separate 1899 Hague treaty, reconfirmed in its 1907 successor, and again in the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, all with broader acceptance than the 1899 Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets.  Unlike the prohibition of weapons or munitions that cause superfluous injury, the text of the 1899 Hague Declaration was not repeated in any subsequent treaty.  The United States did not ratify the 1899 Hague Declaration, but accepted its application to the extent it is consistent with the prohibition against weapons or munitions that cause superfluous injury.

It may seem incongruous to speak in terms of a prohibition on superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (synonymous terms) with respect to military small arms ammunition given that under the law of war military personnel can be and are eviscerated by mines, booby-traps (today referred to as improvised explosive devices), mortar and artillery fire, vaporized by bombs and other explosive devices, or struck by larger caliber 12.7mm, 14.5mm, 20mm or 30mm direct fire weapons.  Yet the prohibition against superfluous injury acknowledges a delicate balancing agreed to by governments between what is and is not legitimate in warfare.  In the development, acquisition, and fielding of all military weapons, including small arms ammunition, it is an important factor.  Proper application requires knowledge of history.

With few exceptions, such as German High Command authorization of 7.92x57mm “B Patrone” aerial spotting ammunition for antipersonnel use by German snipers on the Eastern Front during World War II, military forces generally complied with the 1899 Hague Declaration for operational reasons: (a) weapon functioning reliability, particularly in machine guns, (b) no identified military requirement for ammunition other than full metal jacketed ball and related (tracer, armor piercing) projectiles, and (c) a desire by armies to limit the types of ammunition within their respective logistics pipelines.

Twentieth Century military rifle bullets have tended to deform, expand, and/or fragmented in soft tissue at ranges of 250 meters or less. A 1989 article by Colonel Martin L. Fackler, MC, USA, illustrated a fragmented NATO Standard 7.62x51mm German ball round (DM41 or DM41A1) shot into ten percent ordnance gelatin as described in the body of this article. In 1992 the new German law of war manual stated ‘It is prohibited to use bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body’, an assertion at odds with history. Two months later, for environmental reasons rather than compliance with the manual statement, the German government replaced the DM41 and DM41A1 with the DM111, a boat tail steel projectile with gilded metal plating jacket over copper wash. A ‘green’ primer was used and the lead core capped with a closure disc.

As shown, tests following Dr. Fackler’s protocol established the DM111 may fragment in soft tissue. Note separated closure disc.

The 1899 Declaration led to confusion by lawyers (through lack of knowledge of small caliber ballistics and historical practice) and hesitation by armaments specialists (through lack of understanding of the Declaration’s text and history), often exacerbated by focus on a particular point without considering the issue in its entirety.  Judging open-tip ammunition solely on projectile appearance resulted in delay in its adoption by military snipers, as described by the author in a previous article (“Open Tip Match: When a ‘Hollow Point’ is Not a Hollow Point,” SADJ, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2012) is a case in point.

In his article “Wounding Patterns of Military Rifle Bullets” (International Defense Review 1, 1989), Colonel Martin L. Fackler, Medical Corps, U.S. Army, an experienced combat surgeon, provided photographic evidence showing that while the U.S. version of the 7.62x51mm NATO ball (M80) remained intact and without deformation upon striking soft tissue, the German version (either DM41 or DM41A1) tended to yaw quickly and fragment.  Yet the 1992 German Law of War manual stated, “It is prohibited to use bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body,” following the 1899 Hague Declaration text (to which Germany is a party), but included “projectiles of a nature to deform while penetrating the human body [or] to tumble early in the human body,” language apparently provided by International Committee of the Red Cross representatives who at the time were engaged in an effort (subsequently halted following unfavorable peer reviews) to create more restrictive post-Cold War rules for military weapons and ammunition.  When informed by the present author of the manual language contradiction with German military ammunition terminal ballistics, the manual author admitted he was unaware of it, having failed to consult with German military ammunition specialists.

The ammunition displayed in Dr. Fackler’s article was replaced in the early 1990s by the Patrone 7.62×51 DM111 (steel jacket with gilding metal plating) and DM111A1 (gilding metal jacket).  Type classified in October 1992, two months after publication of the German manual, the DM 111 was the result of efforts to develop environmentally friendly ammunition to reduce harmful emissions generated through the primer and the projectile’s exposed lead core.  The lead acid primer was replaced with a “green” primer and the exposed lead core was capped with a closure disc.  No bullet fragmentation was observed in German ballistics test shots at twenty-five and fifty meters.  A 2012 U.S. test of DM 111 ammunition fired into ballistic gel at ten meters (the same distance at which Dr. Fackler tested ammunition) resulted in projectile fragmentation, including separation of the closure disc from the projectile base.

It is not the author’s intent to criticize German ammunition or suggest it violated the 1899 Hague Declaration.  The anecdote was offered to illustrate a lack of working knowledge by some with respect to history and a failure to consult with subject-matter experts prior to arriving at what may prove ill-founded conclusions. History provides numerous examples prior to and following the 1899 Hague Declaration of fragmentation of military rifle-caliber ammunition in soft (human) tissue.

In the 1950s Sierra Bullets introduced its MatchKing, a 168-grain .30 caliber (7.62mm) open tip bullet designed to maximize accuracy.  The open tip design employs a precision deep drawn jacket with lead inserted from the front tip and ogival forming from the open tip mouth.  The result is better manufacturing control and more consistent quality than possible with traditional full metal jacket (FMJ) bullet designs formed from tip to base.

The MatchKing design originated strictly for competitive match.  The open tip’s meplat diameter was kept as small as the manufacturing process allowed to maximize aeroballistic performance.  The dimension is process controlled as a critical dimension and is approximately 0.052” while the actual opening is less than 0.030”.  Minimizing the meplat minimizes aerodynamic drag, preserving velocity, reducing time of flight, and providing a high quality flatter shooting bullet.  The MatchKing’s extremely small aperture stands in contrast to traditional hunting bullet designs that depend on large or skived openings or other enhancements to improve terminal performance.  Throughout the years, Sierra Bullets has recommended against use of the MatchKing bullet for hunting because it was not designed for terminal ballistics.  Sierra’s Reloading Manual (5th edition) states, “The MatchKing bullets are designed for pinpoint accuracy, with no consideration given to what might happen after impact.  If the bullet has arrived on target accurately, its job is done at that point.”

The 168-grain MatchKing was used by the winner in its debut at the 1959 Pan American Games and soon dominated centerfire rifle competition.  Its broad acceptance and proven performance in competition and by civilian law enforcement agencies attests to its success.  As described in this article, military interest in the MatchKing and other open tip match (OTM) bullets, including sniper use in combat, developed slowly due to misunderstandings that persist to this day.

Sierra GameKing bullet (bottom) and MatchKing bullet (top).

The confusion began in 1899 at the First Hague Peace Conference, which adopted a Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets in which governments agreed to abstain from military use of “…bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which do not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions [skiving].”  The declaration was more political than humanitarian, targeting the British .303 caliber Mk. III cartridge with its AL 9402 hollow point bullet in part due to the British War against the Boers in South Africa, notwithstanding the fact that the Mk III was never employed in that conflict.  Abstention in use of such bullets applied only between nations party to the declaration.  If a nation party to the Hague Declaration fought the military forces of a nation that was not a party or “savages,” as non-government forces were referred to in colonial times, no prohibition existed against their use.  Only thirty-four nations became parties to this treaty.  During its negotiation Captain William Henry Crozier, Ordnance Corps, U.S. Army (subsequently Chief of Ordnance, 1901-1918), and U.S. delegation member, argued against the declaration’s condemnation-by-appearance vis-à-vis a bullet’s terminal ballistics relative to other contemporary military bullets.  As will be seen, the error Captain Crozier criticized was repeated with respect to military adoption of the MatchKing and similar OTM bullets over the half century following its introduction.  The United States is not a party to the Hague Declaration, but has acted consistent with it.  Potential functioning reliability issues, particularly in machine guns, discouraged interest in projectile design other than FMJ standard ball.  Lack of military interest evolved into an assumption by many that military use of “hollow point” projectiles is prohibited in all circumstances, regardless of design intent and terminal ballistics.

Confusion existed with respect to MatchKing use because different entities used the same words differently.  Sierra categorized the MatchKing as a “boat tail hollow point” owing to its appearance, that is, its open tip.  The 1899 Hague Declaration does not use the term “hollow point” as such, but “hollow point” became the common lay term to summarize the Hague Declaration prohibition, neglecting the additional criteria that the projectile “expand or open easily” on impact with soft tissue at all distances.

In 1980 I had responsibility for conducting the legal review for new military weapons and ammunition required by the Department of Defense to ensure compliance with our treaty obligations.  The Army Marksmanship Unit (AMU) contacted me to ask if it would be permissible for it to acquire the 168-grain MatchKing for competition.  My examination of the MatchKing determined that notwithstanding Sierra’s characterization of it as a “hollow point,” it was not a hollow point in the sense of the prohibition contained in the 1899 Hague Declaration.  Its extremely small aperture stood in obvious contrast to an “expanding bullet” such as the Sierra GameKing.  The GameKing contains a larger aperture than the MatchKing and skiving, that is, cuts to enhance expansion in soft tissue.  Referring to the MatchKing as an “open tip” projectile to get away from the confusion caused by the manufacturer’s description of it as a “hollow point,” acquisition for competition was approved.  The legal review suggested a request for sniper use in combat would be favorably considered.

Left to right: cut-away views of Sierra MatchKing, M80 and Sierra GameKing projectiles.

Military evaluation of the MatchKing (designated) proved its superiority over the 173-grain M118 FMJ projectile that preceded it.  Army tests noted a 36% increase in accuracy with the MatchKing at 300 meters and a 32% accuracy increase at 600 meters.  Marine Corps tests produced similar accuracy figures.  The National Guard determined that the M852 provided better bullet groups at 200 and 600 meters than the M118 under all conditions.

Confusion continued within military circles.  In 1985 the AMU sought assistance from Colonel Martin L. Fackler, Medical Corps, U.S. Army, an experienced combat surgeon and chief of the Army’s wound ballistics laboratory at Letterman Army Institute of Research.  Dr. Fackler’s tests – firing the M852 into ordnance gelatin (20x25x50 centimeter blocks of a 10% weight concentration shot at four degrees centigrade calibrated to reproduce the crush and stretch seen in living animal tissue, a protocol developed by Dr. Fackler widely accepted today) – prompted him to suggest that the MatchKing’s terminal ballistics would be improved by expanding the aperture because M852 terminal ballistics were like those of 7.62mm FMJ M80 Ball.  Dr. Fackler’s suggestion was not accepted.  But his test proved the M852 did not “expand or open easily” as proscribed by the 1899 Hague Convention.  Confusion continued.  In the late 1980s Naval Weapons Support Center Crane procured and tested 7.62 and .300 Winchester Magnum OTM ammunition with specially manufactured polished closed tips for possible sniper training and combat use, based on the belief that the OTM was prohibited for combat use because of its “hollow point.”  Although tests results were positive, Crane officials expressed concern that the projectile might violate the Hague Declaration because of bullet break up at close range, notwithstanding the fact that fragmentation of the polished closed tip M852 was no greater than U.S. military FMJ M80 Ball, and appreciably less than M80 Ball projectiles used by some NATO militaries.

Individuals judging the MatchKing solely on its appearance failed to consider the foundation law of war principle of distinction.  It obligates a government and its military to develop and apply force against an enemy military in a manner that limits risk of injury to innocent civilians.  A well-trained military sniper equipped with a contemporary sniper rifle, including its optics, using the most accurate ammunition, is the epitome of distinction.  A civilian law enforcement agency using something less than the most accurate sniper ammunition could face potential liability were an innocent civilian killed or injured by a police sniper’s shot during a hostage situation, as plaintiff’s attorneys would argue that using less-accurate ammunition was negligent when ammunition with significantly greater accuracy was available.  This rigid standard does not exist in a combat environment.  Nonetheless an important legal obligation was neglected by those who hesitated in requesting approval for combat use of the MatchKing, particularly given the significant increase in accuracy it manifested over the M118.

Caution regarding MatchKing projectile fragmentation was unwarranted.  Twentieth Century terminal ballistics history established that FMJ military rifle projectiles sometimes fragment in soft tissue at distances up to 250 meters, dependent upon velocity, angle of projectile yaw at impact, and similar factors.  Governments have acknowledged and accepted this phenomenon in international conferences over the past four decades, declining to extend the 1899 Hague Declaration’s prohibition beyond bullets designed to “expand or open easily” at every distance.

Hesitation in requesting authorization for M852 combat use faded in 1990 in the lead-up to Operation DESERT STORM, the U.S.-led Coalition effort to liberate Kuwait following Iraq’s invasion.  The request for legal review was answered in the affirmative the same day.  The logistics system was not as responsive.  M852 use in DESERT STORM cannot be confirmed.

The Sierra Open Tip Match on the left and the Sierra GameKing on the right.

The .300 Winchester Magnum 190-grain Sierra MatchKing  (MK 248 MOD 0) was adopted by the Navy in 1993.  In 1993 the Marine Corps identified its expectations for 7.62x51mm accuracy.  U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Armaments Research, Development and Engineering Center, in conjunction with Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, requested Sierra Bullets to design and build prototype projectiles to meet Marine Corps performance objectives.  The M852 was succeeded in 1997 by the 7.62mm Special Ball Long Range M118LR with 175-grain Sierra MatchKing.  The 175-grain Sierra MatchKing exceeded Marine Corps requirements.  When shooters properly accounted for environmental factors, the 175-grain Sierra MatchKing loaded as the Federal Premium Gold Medal Match reliably struck targets at one mile.

The 5.56mm 77-grain Sierra MatchKing MK 262 MOD 0/1 (DODIC AA53) was fielded in 2000.  Navy (Crane) product improvement programs led to the 7.62 MK 316 MOD 0 Special Ball, Long Range (DODIC AB39), continuing to employ the 175-grain Sierra MatchKing, and the 220-grain Sierra MatchKing .300 Winchester Magnum Match MK 248 MOD 1 (DODIC AB43) in 2008.  In each case wound ballistics tests based upon Dr. Fackler’s protocol, today an integral part of the legal review of new military small arms ammunition, reconfirmed Dr. Fackler’s 1985 conclusion that the terminal ballistics of OTM projectiles are similar to those of FMJ Ball, that is, they do not “expand or open easily” in soft tissue.

Experts in The Netherlands and Switzerland further confirmed the legality of OTM ammunition for military sniper use.  In 2001, a Swiss ballistics expert at the Swiss Low Noise Ballistics Facility described the OTM as a “hollow point that doesn’t perform like a hollow point” with respect to its terminal ballistics.  Today OTM ammunition is offered by a number of manufacturers for law enforcement and military use and has been adopted and employed by other militaries in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts.  OTM fielding in other calibers, such as .300 Norma Magnum and .338 Lapua Magnum are under consideration.

Misunderstanding through ignorance persists.  In 2006 a U.S. Army sniper approached his ammunition supply point in Iraq to request a re-supply of the M118LR.  The civilian contractor took the ammunition out of its storage space, looked at the marking on the box stating “NOT FOR COMBAT USE” and refused to issue the ammunition to the sniper, instead instructing him to down load less-accurate linked M80 ball for use in his sniper rifle.  The sniper turned to an Army judge advocate (JAG) for assistance.  The JAG agreed with the ASP contractor.  When provided a copy of the 1997 legal review of the M1118LR containing a detailed explanation as to its legality and rationale for approving its combat use, the JAG questioned the legal review’s value because it was “nine years old.”  Legal reviews of weapons and ammunition do not have a “shelf life,” but are “forever” documents.  The situation ultimately was resolved in the sniper’s favor, but not before it gained national media attention.

This incident was avoidable. The “not for combat use” language was placed on OTM ammunition boxes in 1980 when it was approved for military competition use.  When the M852 and M118LR were approved for combat use, no one told the contractor who made the boxes to remove the offending language.  It was deleted when the current box was ordered (illustration, lower right corner).  Confusion bred by ignorance continues in some circles.  An ally recently (and quickly) rejected a private citizen’s assertion that OTM ammunition violated the 1899 Hague Declaration.

The adage “don’t judge a book by its covers” is applicable with respect to the Sierra MatchKing and comparable open tip match projectiles.  Sierra Bullets’ characterization of the MatchKing as a “hollow point” likely exacerbated the practice of judging the projectile based solely on its appearance.  Sierra Bullets has remedied this somewhat by referring to it as “open tip match” in its invoices.  The problem was further aggravated by the failure of many to read and understand the text of the1899 Hague Declaration, and to incorrectly assume that any projectile with a “hollow point” would “expand or open easily” at all distances.  The International Criminal Court limited the prohibition to military use of bullets designed to expand or open easily only when employed to “uselessly aggravate suffering or the wounding effect upon the target.”  In this respect the international community belatedly arrived at the point argued by Captain Crozier in 1899.